The Weinberger Doctrine.

When Should We Use Military Force?

I served in the USAF for just under 22 years, and in that time, I saw us end the Vietnam war, engage in a number of brief military operations (with varying success), and fight a short, but violent, conventional war to reestablish Kuwait sovereignty.  Along the way, there were a number of Secretaries of Defense, most of whom made some impacts that may have been newsworthy at the time but left little impression on me.  There is one exception to this and he was Ronald Reagan’s first SECDEF – Casper Weinberger.

In supporting the President, he along with the Secretary of State George Schultz created the conditions to broker an international reduction in Nuclear Arms between the Soviet Union and the United States and NATO with the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces talks.  But their shared strategic vision would ultimately lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Yet, despite these successes for America, he was routinely criticized by President Reagan’s political opponents in the Congress.

During his tenure, we saw the military forces of the United States begin the rebuilding and modernization the Nixon/Ford and Carter administrations had put off after the withdrawal from Vietnam as they dealt with the inflation caused by unbalanced federal spending.

But what I find to be his greatest contribution was something I doubt any of our modern politicians have a clue about.  When it first came out it was known as the Weinberger Doctrine.  It was a simple set of statements on when and how the US should use its military force.  They are listed here.

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed–their size, composition, and disposition–must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. Before the U.S. commits forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

What I think we are seeing today are the choices of a generation of politicians and statesmen who’ve not had the military experience to know the true cost in the human capital of a shrinking military as an instrument of national policy.  The one thing this current war without end will do is change that as more veterans enter into political office.  I just wonder what lessons and experience they will bring as they rise to positions of greater authority.

Unfortunately for us, there is no clear path for disengagement when administrations change or popular support wains.  Sadly, it seems for most of our politicians the commitment of American lives is not an important determination in their political decision making.  They think in much grander, and opaquer, terms where the morality of their position can be justified within the broader context of national security.