In my previous post I talked briefly about the fact the military is not like a commercial enterprise and often the tools the civilian leaders attempt to impose on the force cause more disruption than increased efficiency. Then I dealt with what I view as flaws in the leadership development scheme. They were “Change is Good,” “A Rigged System,” and “First Command.” In this post I intend to discuss the more serious flaws I believe lead to disillusionment and lowering moral. They are “Building an Unsustainable Force,” “Social Justice is a Core Mission,” “A Lack of Personal Accountability,” and “Performance Reviews are Smoke.”
We have built an unstainable force and are unwilling to admit it. Obviously, we operate within a defined and regulated budget and the amount of money available to pay for everything all the politicians in Congress, The President, and the SECDEF would like is finite. The office of the SECDEF sets guidelines the AF leadership must comply with to stay within its budget. It also projects the costs into the out-years so it can plan for the force and force modernization. As the Air Force looks to modernize to 5th Generation Fighters they sought ways to pare the single largest cost in the Air Force, its manpower bills. Based on the choices available we drew the force down to a little over 320,000 as an end strength. That number is climbing slightly but the force today is far below what it was when we had a cold war. Today we have a warmish hot war and the force is asked to do far more than what it had ever been built to do prior to 9/11. In 1960, when the threat of nuclear war was the principal challenge the USAF faced had 813,474 personnel to meet its global commitments. As the Vietnam war grew so did the AF, reaching a peak strength of 905,314 in 1967. During President Reagan’s years, the force stood around 600,000, or just a little less than twice its current strength. Back then we were a garrison force where most people spent most of their time training with short TDYs and an expectation they would be home within a week or two of leaving. The longer rotations of 90 days were usually at locations that offered some social time off. Even with the longer deployments, the stress of the force was manageable and an individual could expect a high demand assignment followed by a relatively stable one.
After Desert Storm, we began moving from a garrison force to a rotational force as we closed base after base to reduce cost. This has created a situation where significant numbers of personnel are pushed forward for 3, 4 or 6-month deployments at something that hovers around a 1 to 4 ratio. Following 9/11 that ratio when down to about 1 to 2.5 and for those forces in demand the ratio often approaches a 1 to 1. While we have been doing this -- new demands continuously flow down, requiring short notice response and a total force commitment where Guard and Reserve forces now carry a much greater percentage of the load then they were ever envisioned. Meanwhile, we close bases, retire aircraft, and further reduce the force until the only people left to deploy are those who are not up for a new assignment or school slot. The toll on the humans in this cycle are measurable in terms of divorce, PTSD and other mental issues. Suicides are up, DUI is up, and separations are up for those who see no light at the end of the tunnel.
Those who’ve been recognized for their high potential don’t seem to be subject to the same rotational demands as their peers for they are serving as executive officers, on a command staff, in professional development, or serving at the higher echelons of a joint force to get the credits necessary for flag rank. The result is obvious. To use a farming analogy, we are eating the seed corn of tomorrows crop of leaders and commanders. Those positions will still exist, but the quality of the officers and senior NCO’s that will fill them will be less than it was.
We have reduced our ability to fill the pipeline as we reduce training capacity in UPT and UCSO (UNT for old folks like me). Of course, we did this for sound economic reasons, but when individuals in the prime of their capability abandon their career the inexperienced airman needed to replace them just don’t exist. We see this especially in the UAV/RPA pipeline where again to save costs we are now beginning to qualify NCOs as “pilots.”
We will never say “we must do more with less,” because of past experiences but isn’t that exactly what we ask of your airman?
Social Justice has become a core task or mission. When I entered the Air Force we were in the middle of the social unrest caused by the Vietnam war, but there was a more fundamental issue, and that was discrimination of the black minorities. President Truman, over the objections of his senior military commanders, had integrated the armed forces in 1948, but still subtle and not-so-subtle discrimination existed in 1974 when I became a Lieutenant. The CSAF mandated equality training for all personnel and we did this until the service grew tired and declared success in racial equality.
President Obama did the same thing as President Truman for the LGBT community, and now the service is in the process of training its force that LGBT personnel must be treated fairly and equally. Personally, I think President Obama’s choice was better than the direction of President Clinton which was “don’t ask, don’t tell,” but there are some significant morality and social issues that come with mandating individual support and implied approval of sexual orientation that does not arise when we mandate people not be discriminated against because of their race.
As we see in the civilian culture we come from there is an increasingly militant approach to demanding that society view itself in accordance with the most vocal voices of a pretty small minority. The service draws from society and those same forces are at work. The senior leadership, just like in Truman’s years, have one view of the world and the younger airman another. We see in President Trump an attempt to return to a policy that would bring us back to an earlier time. In my opinion that is a foolish choice that will only compound the unrest and delay what must be the ultimate goal of integration into a cohesive fighting force.
Whatever your view on the current social justice diatribes, the services inability to provide a consistent policy where all are treated equally is demoralizing the force. Today we have some who demand equality, and others who view the minorities as receiving an unfair advantage. Both positions seem to be relatively small, but both are vocal enough to detract from the unit cohesion necessary in a fighting force.
Let’s discuss accountability. The one thing a bureaucracy does really well is to provide a shield or buffer for accountability. For example:
Customer service rep: We can’t approve your form 123.
Customer: Why?
Rep: Well it’s our policy not to approve this form.
Customer: What should I do to get this approved?
Rep: You need to submit another form asking for approval of this form
Customer: Is there someone I can talk to?
Rep: No, you have to submit form 123 to talk to someone.
By most standards the Air Force is a pretty good bureaucracy to work for, its Commanders and Senior Leaders are frequently voicing their support for some magical thing called “empowerment” where a conversation like I illustrated above won’t happen. But on the other hand, we have all developed a “cooperate and graduate” kind of mentality where failure, except in the most extreme or most public situations is kind of pushed aside, so careers are not adversely affected by those mistakes.
For example, how many flying squadron commanders have been relieved of command by their commanders, but still make O-6 because they’ve filled all the squares and the relieving authority didn’t want to hurt a good officer they just didn’t trust to lead anyone. What message does this convey to the subordinates?
Then, of course, there are those who go from bungling one job after another and their commanders pass them off as quickly as possible so they don’t have to deal with them. At the end of the day their career experiences are really broad and look good on paper and all the sudden they are promoted to senior ranks and seemingly no one knows why.
Don’t get me wrong, I’m not advocating we return to the days of flogging or making the guilty sit in the town square in stocks but having someone swinging from the yardarm occasionally might be okay. (This is humor, and I point it out just in case some are unfamiliar with the concept.)
There is a business management consultant named Peter Drucker. He is best known for his theory that business can never be really efficient because people are promoted at least one level above their competence. This is known as the “Peter Principle.” My experience in the Air Force suggested long ago we will generally promote at least two pay grades above competence based on the masking of competence in the promotion recommendation files. Which brings me to my last flaw.
The Promotion System is Smoke and Mirrors. We have reached a point in the evaluation process where secret words and phrases are more important than actually telling individuals how they perform in comparison to their peers. For rated officers, how well you do your primary job is hardly ever a data point, unless you happen to earn a DFC or MOH and then it will be noted in your records that you did well.
The people who do the evaluations may or may not be taught how to evaluate people or what the secret words are, and if they don’t know the secret words - every one of the people they rate will suffer the consequence. Of course, there are good leaders who will sit down with the people they lead and who will provide honest and candid feedback on how the individual is doing and areas they can improve on. In attempting to formalize this feedback system into a mandated requirement complete with specific form the bureaucracy condemns the majority to a perfunctory interview with the rater where he/she is usually working to complete his/her task as quickly as possible since they have multiple people to advise/counsel.
There is a management technique referred to a “Management by Walking Around.” Personally, I find this the best and most effective way to provide both the leader with a clear understanding of those who are working and those who aren’t as well as providing quality performance feedback to the organization. The most important aspect of this is a rather common-sense rule that seems to be lost in today’s world. The boss should not condemn or belittle the staff in public, but if a criticism is necessary it should be done on a one and one basis in private.
Then we come to the idea of feedback for the Commander. In the traditional sense of organizational behavior feedback traditionally flows down, not up. The bosses boss ultimately determines if they are doing a good job or not, but over the past twenty years, the Air Force has become (in theory at least) an organization concerned for the welfare of its entire force. Routinely they conduct anonymous climate surveys to give the Wings and MAJCOMs feedback on how the minions are doing. This is a nice tool, but I don’t think it provides the direct feedback that forces the Commanders to reassess their personal style or techniques. As I said bureaucracies are good at maintaining a lack of accountability.
I wonder what would happen if, when it came time for a commander’s performance report to be written there was a required entry on organizational feedback where the subordinates got to rate the officer on three-point scale (Definitely Promote, Promote, Do Not Promote) and the statistical average was placed next to the recommendation of the Senior Rater. What would the promotion boards look like if they had to consider evaluations from subordinates as well as the senior commanders?
Once, when I was speaking to a boss about how as we are paring down reports to the minimum possible explanation of impact and capability I wondered how the board would know who should really be considered for readiness for promotion. Without thinking, he made a candid statement he realized immediately was a mistake. He said, “Don’t worry the board members know who should be promoted.” He then went on to say, “What I mean to say is an entire record is considered.”
If we could be completely candid perhaps we would change the reports to reflect some of the dry humor the British are so famous for. Consider these for reference.
Well, that’s about it for me. I don’t have any answers to fix the problems, so perhaps I shouldn’t bother noting them, but I needed something to think and write about so this was as good as anything.
For those who are currently in mid-career, good luck. Look for those choices you control and never believe you are a victim. Remember, you control your life and your career, even when it’s not going as you envisioned. Look for the good in your choices and keep moving forward. Best wishes from an old Nav.
