The Organization and its Priority
Organizational Behavior is the
study of how both group and individual performance and activity with an
organization. Obviously there are at
least two perspectives of this study.
The first is to view the organization from an external aspect, the other
is to study the organization’s internal workings and structure.
If we look at the Air Force,
the youngest of services, we see a rather unique organization within the
Defense bureaucracy. It came to life as
an evolution of the technology that created it.
Although the use of airships to create “a high ground” to observe the
enemy can be traced back to the Civil War, it was not until the Wright Brothers
created their Flyer that the potential for true military application was
possible. Even then the US Army and the
Navy were not the first to recognize the potential.
Prior to the second world war
the US Army Air Corp made up about 12% of the Army’s total strength. There were strategic thinkers, a few zealots,
and a bunch of young officers they would mentor. Their principle battles were with the
civilian and senior Army leadership to show how air power could serve as a
strategic weapon and decide the outcome of conflict without putting vast
numbers of soldiers at risk. Their most
significant goal of the 1930’s was to build a bomber capable of reaching deep
into an enemy’s homeland, inflicting definitive damage and returning home. They believed these bombers would be capable
of defending themselves, protecting their crews, and overcoming whatever
defenses the enemy put before them.
What we discovered in the war
was regardless of how many guns they had the bombers where vulnerable to the
air defenses and needed protection from escorting aircraft to help fight off
the attacking fighters. If you have ever
seen a flock of small birds driving off a hawk, then you can picture the way
the bomber-interceptor conflict works.
Following the war, proponents
for the US Army Air Forces commissioned a study of the affects of strategic
bombing.[i] This comprehensive study found, not
surprisingly, that the role of the Air Force was “decisive” in determining the
final outcome of the war. This study
would be one of the principle tools used by advocates for a separate Air Force
as justification for its creation.
So what we see from the very
origin of the Air Force was an organizational belief that technology was the
foundation of the service. The
employment of the most modern technology would allow the Air Force to deter a
conflict or win it decisively. This is a
nice fit for a civilian leadership that is always looking for a way to reduce
defense costs. The purchase of hardware
is manageable and measurable by the bean counters. The costs of the personnel are not quite as
neat and simple. The escalating costs of
pay and benefits have long term implications that last long after the the
personnel leave. I believe this is one
of the real reasons the Veterans Administration was created. To take the burden of long-term
responsibility and pigeon hole it into a location where the Secretary of
Defense didn’t have to worry so much about it.
This belief in the inherent
quality of technology is a two-edged sword.
On the one hand it appeals to those who believe advanced technology
holds the keys to the future, on the other it argues against the value of the
humans who are the life-blood of any organization.
From its formation the Air
Force has wrestled with the issue of funding as it fought for legitimacy. We need only look back at the battles with
the US Navy over funding of the B-36 Peacemaker to recognize the cost of the
technology and its importance to the long-term success and survival of the
service. Those battles exist today, just
as they existed in the post WW II era.
Each new technology comes with a cost that says something else will not
be funded. Today we look at F-35 vs F-16/A-10
and a new high performance pilot trainer, or B-21 vs B-52/B-1/B-2. The cost of each new generation of technology
is no longer an incremental increase but almost an order of magnitude
higher. The current bill payers for
these new “golden BB’s” is manpower, for that is the only other source left to
draw from.
Over the course of its history
the US Army has come to define the organizations that make up the Army as one
of three types. There are of course, the
combat arms, those forces that will actually engage the enemy in combat these
are the Infantry, Armor, Artillery (field and air defense), Aviation, Combat
Engineers, and Special Forces (Rangers and SF).
Recently Cyber Forces have are being viewed by some as part of the
Combat Arms. Then there are the Combat Support forces, those organizations and
personnel who directly support the combat arms.
These include the Chemical Corps, Corp of Engineers, Military
Intelligence, Military Police, Signal and some components of Aviation (e.g.
battlefield reconnaissance).[ii]
Finally, everything else falls into Combat Service Support. These would be the personnel troops, finance,
acquisition, transportation, and food services.
I point out the Army constructs
because they are relevant to the challenging nature of the Air Force and the
demands of internal organization and leadership. Since its creation the combat forces of the
Air Force were those fighter, bomber, and eventually missile crews who would be
expected to directly engage the enemy.
These were a relatively small portion of the total service. The dilemma for senior officers, drawn
predominately from the bomber, or then the fighter force, was how to make an
inclusive organization where everyone felt part of the primary mission? A reflection of the nature of
this reality is seen in the relationship between AF Officers and NCO/Airman,
especially when compared to other services.
There has been, since I joined in 1974 a more relaxed relationship in
the AF between its leaders and its junior members. I wondered about this for a long time, and
have come to the conclusion that it was because it was principally the officers
that went into harms way and they were not ordering their man to the sounds of
the cannon. In the Army a 2nd
Lieutenant could be ordered to send his platoon of 15-30 men into harms
way. He would lead them, but he or she
knows the brunt of the battle will be borne by them. This holds true for all levels up to the Corp
Commander. [Note: This current war has
changed things for the AF, but our leadership has not fully grasped that
change. Today our warriors are not the
pilots or aircrew flying well above the battlefield, but they are the junior
officers and enlisted of the combat controller, tactical air control party, pararescue and combat weather career fields who are embedded with the Army units
on the ground. If you doubt this -- look at
the Air Force Crosses and Silver Stars awarded since 2001.]
A second point, as noted above
from the time an Army officer enters the service he or she is trained to deal
with people. Those who are effective in
this role are then trained to do staff work, but always they come back to
dealing with people. In the Navy,
officers are trained in their skill set but even the flying junior officers are
assigned personnel to lead, manage, direct and discipline. Unlike those other services, the rated
officers of the Air Force are not routinely assigned jobs that require the
leadership, management or direction of junior personnel, rather they will work
within their squadron as glorified administrative assistants to the
commander. For almost all rated officers
the first opportunity to actually be responsible for the lives and welfare of
their personnel is as a 38-year-old Lieutenant Colonel squadron commander
(something General Olds did as a 22 year old Major).
Next, like all organizations
the AF struggles to find the best management practices to improve its
operational efficiency. Unfortunately
for the the AF this means that every new Secretary or Chief of Staff that comes
in finds a need to either tweak or completely revamp the management style. In the forty plus years I’ve been associated
with the organization I’ve seen us change management philosophies about every 8
years. Usually these changes are caused
by some new management fad that is sweeping industry and is introduced by the
civilian leadership as a one size fits all solution to the perceived ills of
the organization. Perhaps my favorite
example is at the conclusion of Desert Storm, where the down-sizing Air Force
had just demonstrated the actual strategic benefits of its cold war force we
implemented a version of Total Quality Management, a system to improve
production of items by empowering the workers on the manufacturing line to implement
continuous improvement to reduce manufacturing errors. In the civil sector you heard such things as
“Quality is Job 1” and “Zero Defect.” I
am not sure the Air Force ever came to grips with how to measure sortie effectiveness
to avoid pilot error and loss of an aircraft, or avoid a mistake on a travel
voucher, but we did have classes and instruction that most of the higher level
leaders never embraced. When this
routinely occurs even the lowest A1C recognizes this as a lip service effort
and leadership credibility goes out the window.
At that point leadership within the organization becomes little more
than cheerleaders for the latest jingle.
Finally, what General Olds'
notes as his authority as a 22-year-old Major was not strictly authority so
much as responsibility. The authority
rested in levels above him, just as it did when he was a General. The responsibility to do all the things he
did as a Major shifted because others didn’t want to do them and the AF created
organizations ostensibly so the Squadron Commander’s could focus on
accomplishing the primary mission of the unit.
He never captures the real issue: he was a major at the same age today’s
officers are second lieutenants. He led men into combat who were peers and he
was one of them, he learned to lead because he and his flight commanders were
all trying to hack the mission, survive, and bring their friends home. They were not trying to reach the next grade or worry
about the responsibilities of pay, housing, and chow. Today’s flying squadron
commanders are not peers with their most proficient aircrew. They are, in the best cases, former great
pilots, navigators/CSOs, and aircrew who have been recognized and promoted for
their abilities, or they are, in many cases, marginal aircrew who
have demonstrated good staff skills and found senior mentors who will pull them
along.
That will be the focus of the
next part.
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