Preface:
This post actually originates
from a suggestion by a colleague who laments the lack of good leadership in the
Air Force. He suggested I read Brigadier
General Robin Olds’ letter to an ACSC student who had written to him on the topic
back in 1981. General Olds is a
celebrated fighter pilot with 16 air to air victories in World War II and
Vietnam.[i] He was commander of the 8th
Fighter Wing (Wolf Pack) in the Vietnam conflict where he led OPERATION BOLO,
intended to surprise the North Vietnamese AF and engage attacking Migs in air
to air combat to reduce the threats they posed to the F-105 strike forces. He was promoted to Brigadier General on his
completion of command and return to the States.
From 1967 to 73 he served as
the Air Force Academy Commandant of Cadets, and his final job in the AF was as
Director of Aerospace Safety for the HQ USAF.
While there he conducted an inspection tour of AF combat units in
Southeast Asia where he warned that if the combat operations over North Vietnam
were resumed AF losses would be heavy based on the “systemic lack of interest
in air to air combat training for fighter aircrews.”[ii] His report proved prophetic. With the initiation of OPERATION LINEBACKER
in 1972 the Air Force aircrews fared far worse than USMC and USN crews and had
a miserable 1:1 kill to loss ratio.[iii] He retired in 1973.[iv]
As a part of the 1981 Air
Command and Staff Curriculum, Major Terry Schwalier was tasked with completing
a research project and writing what would amount to a Masters thesis. As part
of his research he wrote several senior officers seeking advice on what
qualities went into making a good flight commander? For those not familiar with AF structure a
fighter flight commander is generally a Captain put in administrative charge of
a number of younger officers. He should be well qualified in his aircraft, and able to lead at least the formation of his/her flight. This is the first "leadership" position for a rated officer in the AF. By all accounts General Olds’ response went well
beyond answering the original question, and has been widely circulated among
those dissatisfied with today's climate.
30 Nov 1981
Dear Major
Schwalier,
Your
question, or better request, is provocative, to say the least. I
have thought much since receiving your Oct 21 letter, and the more I consider
your topic, the more difficult it becomes to frame a reasonable or even useful
response. I’ll try to boil down my thoughts, hoping something useful
may distill.
First, let
me get some negatives in perspective. In my view, current Air Force
philosophy and practice have all but eliminated any meaningful role playable by
an officer placed in a so-called position of command. Authority has
evaporated, sucked up to the rarified heights of “they,” who are somehow felt
to exist in the echelons above. For your information, “they” do not
exist. Neither is there any “he” fulfilling that
role. Authority is expressed through the medium of committee
consensus, leadership has become a watered down adherence to the principles of
camp counsellorship, with a 90% emphasis on avoiding any action that may in any
way be questioned by any one of hundreds of piss ants on the administrative
ladder above. In fact, leadership (and I use that term with
contempt) has become a process of looking busy as hell while doing nothing,
avoiding personal commitment, and above all, making no decision without prior
approval.
Historical
example: as a 22 year old Major, commanding a squadron in 1945, I was
responsible for and empowered to: pay the troops; feed them; house
them; train them; clothe them; promote; demote; reward; punish; maintain their
personnel files, etc. When I retired as a BG in 1973, I possessed
not one of those authorities or responsibilities. Get the drift?
And you ask
the importance of a flight commander. I am tempted to say
NONE. But that is not true, for in spite of the system, in spite of
the executive and administrative castration, a man instinctively looks to a
system of military authority in a military situation or system. If
that authority is waffled or watered, he still looks to those appointed to the
military echelons to do their best under the circumstances. A man (a
nation for that matter) wants, demands, leadership. So today’s
flight leader/commander leads and commands by example, by appeal to basic
instinct, and by light footed avoidance of error, like walking a
tightrope. He has responsibility, for sure. But he does
not have authority, or freedom of
discretion/interpretation. Unfortunately, in some units he really
isn’t given much voice. Yet he functions, and if he is successful
(perhaps a better word is “effective”) it is greatly to his credit for having
done so under the prevailing circumstances.
Another
thought. All else to the contrary, two basic demands are faced by
the Flight Commander. One is PEACE, the other is WAR. It
has been my experience, in the fighter business I hasten to add, that the man
who may excel under the one is not necessarily worth a damn under the
other. Many examples come to mind. I do not (and did not)
condemn one man or the other, rather I accepted the challenge of recognizing
the difference and choosing accordingly.
I hope some
of this makes sense.
Sincerely,
Robin Olds
P.S. For
your information, there is no such thing as HQ, USAF. The highest
echelon is a faceless entity, composed of thousands of diverse individuals
loosely arranged by a system of interlocking committees and headed by an individual
technically labeled the “Chief of Staff.” Note he is not called the
Commander. By law, he cannot be. By nature he is forced
to be the consummate bureaucrat, fighting for the all mighty dollar, serving as
a buffer between Sec Def / Congress and the people and mission of his service –
a demanding, demeaning role playable by very few.[v]
As General Olds points out the
role of a squadron commander has changed dramatically from what it was in
1945. The responsibility to actually run
all aspects of the squadron has been eliminated as bureaucracy has grown, but
for me the singularly most distinctive point is kind of glossed over in the
paragraph. He was a 22-year old Major in
charge of the lives of his men. He was
not, as we have today, a 35-year old Lt Col who has spent the first 16 years of
his or her career trying to figure out how to get to this point. When the nation is 100% committed to war, and
the Army had grown from its pre-war strength of 180,000 (22,000 in the Air
Corp) to its war time strength of over 8.2 million (2.2 million in the US Army
Air Force) promotions came fast and went to men who performed. Loss rates during the war kept that flow of
commanders moving up as those above them were lost to promotion or combat.
The responsibilities Major Olds
had were impressive and probably did much to help shape him as an effective combat
leader and perhaps an effective peacetime leader as well, but would they work
for today’s Air Force Officer, or even today’s Air Force? If not, what is the problem we have with
growing effective leaders?
[To be continued]
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