Operation Eagle Claw, Night 2 (the night that never was)

Disclaimer:  I am writing this some 41 years post-event so you will understand if I screw some of the facts up, or perhaps I remember correctly and the official histories were changed to protect the guilty.

Operation Eagle Claw was, almost from day one, understood to be a two-night operation.  There are a number of reasons for this, but mostly they all involve the limitations of speed, distance, and time of useful darkness.  At the time we didn’t have a helicopter that could cover the distance from the Southern Iranian coast to Tehran and out in a single period of darkness.  I assume the thoughts of launching from Turkey was dismissed for operational security concern or host nation relationships, and of course, the Russians were busy screwing themselves up in Afghanistan.  The need for C-130s to land and refuel the helicopters was driven by two considerations.  First, the Navy would not allow inflight refuellable helicopters without folding rotor blades to fill up the flight deck of their aircraft carriers, and equally important was Col Beckwith’s demand that his Delta Force operators not have to sit in a helicopter for a six-hour flight to the middle of the desert.

These two considerations drove the development of a forward arming (or area) and refueling point (FARP) procedure that was the whole intent of the Desert One concept of operations.  The need to carry as much JP-4 fuel as possible was the reason three of the six aircraft used in the Desert One event were EC-130s.  The EC-130E was an airborne command-and-control aircraft modified to carry a command-and-control capsule.  It was inflight refueling capable, like the MC-130E but unlike the MC-130 its basic operating weight, once the capsule was taken out, was only about 82,000 pounds so it could carry almost 16,000 pounds more gas than the MC before the aircraft reached their emergency war order limit of 175,000 pounds.

I won’t go into some of the ideas the planners went through before they came to the conclusion, we had to actually land to refuel the helicopters, but suffice it to say there were some creative attempts that would have made Wiley E. Coyote and the Acme company proud. 

If things had gone as planned, instead of as they did, we would have landed in the middle of the desert, refueled the helicopters, put the Delta Force operators onboard, loaded the CCT and Army Rangers back into the C-130s, and flew back to our staging base leaving nothing besides a few infrared landing lights and some track marks in the sand.  The helicopters would have flown to about 50 miles from Tehran and bedded down in a remote site designated Desert Two.  There they would be met by an Army legend named Major Dick Meadows who had been in country a few weeks and had secured a bunch of trucks Delta would use to drive into the city and to the embassy.

Sometime near the end of the afternoon the next day the force would load up in the trucks and transit to the Embassy.  At the designated time the hundred or so operators would breach the Embassy wall at two or three different places and swarm into the compound to the areas our intelligence believed were the holding points for the captives.  Once the guards had been neutralized (choose for yourself what that means), and the captives identified and secured Delta Force would begin an evacuation of the compound to the football (soccer) stadium across the street.  There the RH-53 helicopters would be waiting to meet them for extraction to the south.

Before the Embassy operation was even underway there were a whole lot of other things happening both at Messiah and at a remote base in Egypt where the main task force had been bedded down.  

There were a number of AC-130H gunships which would be launched to arrive over Tehran at the time of the Embassy takedown to provide any sensor or fire support necessary to minimize the impact of any responding hostile force.  These aircraft would have been refueled over Saudi Airspace to ensure they had the time to loiter to support the assault and the extraction.  They would also cover the approaches to the remote airfield that was to be the night two extraction point.

There were several (I think 3) C-141’s with full medical suites onboard that would land at a remote base south of Tehran to extract the Delta Force, the rescued hostages and any casualties which may have occurred during the operation.

Finally, there were additional MC-130s, with Combat Controllers and Army Rangers who would fly back into Iran to seize a small (and supposedly vacant) airfield where the trans load of the assault force and hostages could take place.

Once the trans loads had been completed the C-141 would head back to Europe, while the AC and MC aircraft would hit their KC-135 tankers and RTB back to either Egypt or Messiah.

We were told by intel they didn’t think the Iranian Air Force would be able to challenge us. Imagine my surprise when they did so well against the Iraqis a few years later. I assume the fleet in the Persian Gulf was prepared to provide top cover should we need it.  I don’t recall them ever being part of our task force or training, but I assume someone in the USN was ready to cover the exfil if needed.  At that time, I don’t believe we had USAF fighters anywhere near to the operation.

For me, there were several truths that came from this operation.

a. We never finalize the plan, we just run out of time to make changes.

b. Simple is better, but not nearly as glorious.

        c. Everyone wants to have a part, but if they all do, who is really in charge?

OPERATION COVID-19

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Amid this medical crisis, I am struck by the similarities to a military campaign.  In war, if you could do everything, everywhere, at once to win the war you would, but that is never the case.  There is never enough equipment, never enough people, and never enough time to plan for that one big thing.  For this reason, wars are fought as a series of campaigns where the Nation’s limited assets can be brought to bear on the enemy with the greatest chance of success.  If successful, it will lead to another campaign, and another, until in the end the General (the Army, or the Nation) is successful.

For those who study history, especially military history, this idea is obvious.  Look at how the rag-tag Continental Army struggled from campaign to campaign until they were finally able to box in General Cornwallis and the British Army at Yorktown, Virginia.  Or the Civil war where first Lee and Army of Virginia and then Grant and the Union Army fought a series of battles, each part of a campaign strategy.  A strategy that ultimately failed for the South because at the end of the day they could not meet the industrial capability of the North.

Now we are confronted with a disease that until 6-months ago did not exist.  We can speculate ad nauseum as to how it developed, or who was responsible, but those debates do little to marshal the finite assets of the nation (or the world) to confront and overcome the enemy.

Since we are agreed this virus comes from China, let’s spend a few moments thinking about the war we are in with insights from a Chinese general who put these thoughts down some 2,500 years ago.

“If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”

Right now, let’s assume we know ourselves (but that will become the real question we must answer).  Clearly, we don’t yet fully understand the enemy.  It is for that reason we are in a delaying campaign as we gather our resources for what will become the next offensive campaign.  Think of the time after December 7, 1941, when the Japanese had decimated the Pacific Fleet, invaded the Philippines, taken over Singapore, and threatened Australia.  We could do little but begin the process of rebuilding, reequipping and training the new forces.  For a morale boost, we sent a small force of B-25 bombers to bomb the island of Honshu but the real efforts were behind the scenes. 

Isn’t that true for us today?  We are marshaling our resources, we have implemented policies intended to delay (not stop) the inevitable spread of the virus until we are better prepared to confront it head-on.  Of course, there are real consequences to this strategy.  First, we have a political opposition and press who have invested the last three years vilifying the chief executive and are now unable to put aside their distaste for the man for the good of the nation.  They question every decision the executive branch makes and questions why everything isn’t achieved yesterday.  It appears for the opposition the destruction of America is an acceptable consequence if they can destroy the man.  Of course, if this had been the opposition's position after December 7^th would we have been able to recover from the losses of Pearl Harbor?  I wonder.

“If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.”

As we deal with this pandemic there will be defeats as we learn more and more about the enemy.  The question for us as a nation is how will we deal with those defeats?  The recent experiences strongly indicate the political opposition will rejoice in each and every instance as they work to achieve their selfish political end.  We see this in the social media where each mistake along the way is highlighted and assigned as an individual fault of the President.  For example, when two people in Arizona decided to self-medicate with a fish tank cleaner with the anti-malaria chemicals the President had mentioned on his daily update.  On-line outlets like Axios were more than happy to condemn the President as if it was directly his fault.  They didn’t have the time, or desire, to make sure the facts of the story actually supported their political agenda.  If we can’t come together in this time of crisis the question is will we ever be capable of unity?

“If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Finally, we come to Sun Tzu’s bottom line.  The fact we refuse to know ourselves as a unified people with a vision for the future suggests this campaign has only a limited chance of success and the economic future of the country for a quick and sustained recovery is questionable.