Flying is Unforgiving

I learned very long ago that flight is demanding.  It does not forgive mistakes easily, nor does it tolerate poor judgement for long.  The same can be said of life, but there is a little more room for error when walking down the street than there is when traveling in a 70-ton cylinder at speeds that cover multiple miles in a minute.  I would like to share a story of one accident that took the lives of my friends, but remarkably spared one.

It happened in the early morning hours of February 26, 1981.  The place was the ocean waters near NAS Cubi Point, Philippines.

The aircrew were assigned to the 1^st Special Operations Squadron.  The unit had recently moved from Kadena AB, Japan to Clark AB, Philippines.  They were participating in a demanding Special Operations Exercise with US Navy SEALS and Australian SAS.   For the year prior to the accident the unit had been heavily tasked as it trained for the rescue of Americans from Iran, while also going through a short notice unit relocation.

The crew involved in the accident were all experienced, although one of the navigators had just arrived at the unit, and was getting his theater checkout from the units Evaluator Nav.

The aircraft was a highly modified MC-130E, equipped with a dual mode terrain following/mapping radar, as well as IR lights for use during landing when using night vision goggles (NVGs).  The use of NVGs was something we had developed for the Iranian mission and had become a standard tactic for the unit.  Unfortunately, the standard night lighting in the cockpit washed out the NVGs and as a workaround technique the aircrew had taken to covering offending lights with duct tape with small slits for the important things like the fire warning system.  This “ad hoc” technique, although not standard, was approved for operational use.

The night’s mission was to infiltrate into an island landing zone, extract the special operations teams and return to Naval Air Station Cubi Point.  The low-level and night assault were the most demanding phases of the mission.  The exfil was thought of as being more administrative, although they would remain low-level until reaching the initial approach fix for Cubi.

The APQ-122 (v8) radar was a good system, but it did have a couple of known issues when operating over open waters with a calm sea-state.  Without good radar returns the system would begin a descent (assuming it was above the set clearance).  To keep from descending too low the radar altimeter was set to 80% of set clearance and was supposed to hold the glide path commands level until the radar had sufficient returns to resume guidance.  That feature was known as “altimeter override.” If you reached 80% set clearance the low altitude warning light would come on to alert the crew.  Unfortunately, the technique of taping the warning light would prove a dangerous and perhaps fatal technique.

The accident report indicated the aircrew flew a shallow, power-on, descent into the water not far from the Philippine coast.  On impact the aircraft broke up (I think at FS-245) and 8 of the 9 crew and the 15 passengers were killed.  Those familiar with a C-130 will recognize FS-245 is the point where the nose is joined to the fuselage of the aircraft during manufacture and is a structural separation point. 

The lone survivor was a young electronic warfare office who had his head down on the console and slammed head first into the EW equipment before being thrown out through the opening created when the aircraft came apart and sank.  His station was just aft of -245.  He was recovered by local fisherman in a partially inflated life raft that also was ejected as the aircraft sank.  The radio operator, right next to him was sitting upright in his seat, his neck was broken by the deceleration forces.

The IN and FE that evening were my good friends and crewmates on the Desert One mission we had flown almost exactly 10-months earlier.

Fatigue was cited as a causal factor along with the technique of covering important warning lights.  The hard lessons of accidents should be remembered, but too often they are put on the shelf unless captured in a WARNING or boldface.

If I could offer one piece of advice for someone coming into a new weapon system it would be to find the safety officer and try and read as many accident reports on your aircraft as you can find.  Since most accidents have crew error as a causal or contributing factor it would seem useful to understand how others have screwed up.  We don’t do that and unfortunately, I have seen avoidable mistakes repeated because in time even the “old heads” just don’t know.

Just food for thought.